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We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with 
multiple alternatives, in which voters have common interests. Voters’ preferences depend on an 
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to the election. Similar to two-alternative elections (e.g., Myer- son (1998)), there always exists 
an informationally efficient equilibrium in which the correct alternative is elected. However, we 
identify new types of coordination failures in elections with more than two alternatives that lead 
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1 Introduction
We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in
a large election with multiple alternatives in which voters have common, state-
dependent preferences and imprecise information about the state of nature.
This scenario should remind the reader of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
(Condorcet (1785)): A jury with common preferences has to elect one of two
alternatives, convict or acquit. If the defendant is guilty, all jurors prefer to
convict. But if the defendant is innocent, all jurors prefer to acquit. However,
the jurors do not know precisely whether the defendant is guilty or innocent;
each juror has an imprecise private signal about the underlying state of nature,
which is independently drawn from the same distribution. Condorcet (1785)
finds that a jury elects the correct alternative with a larger probability than a
single jury member alone, and with probability converging to one if the number
of voters converges to infinity. However, two assumptions are crucial for this
theorem: private signals are more likely correct than incorrect in each state of
nature and jurors vote informatively for their signal.
Assuming strategic voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and Wit (1998),
among others, show that informative voting is not necessarily a Nash equilib-
rium of the game. Nevertheless, a similar result obtains, even if one relaxes the
assumption on private signals. Myerson (1998) shows that there always exists an
’informationally efficient’ equilibrium in which the correct alternative is elected
with probability converging to one if the number of voters converges to infinity.
Other similar models with two alternatives find the same: Information aggre-
gation in a large election is efficient as long as there are two alternatives and
voter preferences are not too different (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996,
1997, 1998, 1999), Bouton and Castanheira (2012)).1 We ask if this result ex-
tends to elections with more than two alternatives when voters have common
preferences. So, we extend Myerson (1998) to more than two alternatives, and
we also allow for abstention.2
Goertz and Maniquet (2009, 2011) consider a large election with three al-
ternatives, but in their model voters do not have common preferences. There
is a certain fraction of partisan voters who always prefer a certain alternative
independent of the state of nature. In Goertz and Maniquet (2011), the voters
with common preferences receive private signals from the same distribution; in
Goertz and Maniquet (2009), they receive signals from different distributions.
Contrary to the previous literature, both articles find that the plurality rule is
not informationally efficient because the correct alternative is not elected with
probability converging to one. In fact, no scoring rule except approval voting
has at least one informationally efficient equilibrium.3 However, the partisan
1Bhattacharya (2012) shows that information aggregation is no longer efficient in two-
alternative elections if voter preferences are sufficiently different.
2Assuming abstention makes the model more general, but the reader will find that none of
the results relies on it.
3This is, in some sense, similar to Ahn and Oliveros (2010) who find for a jury with
common preferences and an election with three alternatives: ”For any finite electorate, the
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voters are the cause of the inefficiency. So, the question remains whether inef-
ficient equilibria also exist in elections without partisans and how this depends
on the number of alternatives.
We find that an informationally efficient equilibrium always exists. There
always exists an unresponsive (inefficient) equilibrium as well. In this equilib-
rium, all voters vote for the same alternative. However, unresponsive equilibria
are not particularly interesting, so we impose a condition on signal distributions
and prior probabilities that rules them out. Under this new condition, all equi-
libria in two-alternative elections are efficient. The same is not true for elections
with more than two alternatives.
First of all, inefficient equilibria exist. And they may be such that voters
vote informatively. We also identify new types of coordination failures that do
not exist with two alternatives. For example, there exist equilibria in which
voters consider certain states of nature infinitively more likely than other states
(that cannot happen with two alternatives - see our discussion below). In these
types of equilibria, the election outcome is inefficient in a state of nature that
is disregarded by at least some of the voters. Precisely the voters who cause
the inefficiency are among those that disregard it, so they have no incentive to
change their vote. Since all voters have the same preferences, the inefficiencies
we find do not stem from problems of preference aggregation, but from coor-
dination failures among voters with common preferences and different private
information.
In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we present our results. In
Section 4, we conclude.
2 The Setting
2.1 The Model
We consider an election with a finite number of alternatives {A1, A2...} = A
and states of nature {ω1, ω2 ...} = Ω. We denote with qi the prior probability
of state ωi, with qi ∈ (0, 1) for all i. Also, |A| = |Ω|. Voters have common,
state-dependent, dichotomous preferences. They prefer a particular alternative
in each state of nature, and are indifferent between the remaining ones:
u(Ai|ωi) = 1 ∀i,
u(Aj |ωi) = 0 ∀j 6= i.
Assuming dichotomous preferences simplifies the strategic environment for the
voters. With dichotomous preferences, they care only about those election out-
comes in which their vote changes the outcome from any of the |A| − 1 disliked
alternatives to the preferred alternative; they do not need to consider election
best equilibrium under approval voting is more efficient than...plurality rule...If any scoring
rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information in large elections, then approval
voting must do so as well” (p.1). However, they do not discuss whether or not inefficient
equilibria exist under any of these two rules.
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outcomes in which they are pivotal between the |A| − 1 less preferred alterna-
tives. Even in this scenario, we find coordination failures among voters that lead
to inefficient equilibria. One can easily imagine that more general assumptions
on the preferences would only increase these problems.4
Voters are strategic and vote as a function of their expected impact on the
outcome of the election. We assume that the electorate is large, but that each
voter has a non-negative probability of being the pivotal voter that can change
the outcome of the election. We incorporate this feature by assuming that the
actual number of voters is uncertain (population uncertainty).5 This is a fairly
common assumption in the literature (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996,
1997, 1999), Myerson (1998, 2000, 2002), Goertz and Maniquet (2009, 2011),
among others). Similarly to Myerson (1998, 2000, 2002) we assume that the
population size is Poisson-distributed with parameter n. The probability that
there are exactly N voters is
P (N |n) = e
−nnN
N !
.
Each voter is pivotal with a strictly positive probability even in equilibria in
which all voters vote for the same alternative. This implies that these types of
equilibria cannot be rule out by ruling out weakly dominated strategies.
Prior to voting, each voter receives some private information about the al-
ternatives in form of an informative, but imprecise, signal about the state of
nature. Signals are independent and identically distributed. In this regard, our
model is similar to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998, 1999), Myerson (1998),
and Goertz and Maniquet (2011).6 Since voters are otherwise identical, the
signal determines the type of a voter. For simplicity, we assume that there are
only |Ω| types, so that T = {t1, ..., t|Ω|}. We denote by ri(tj) the probability
that a voter is of type tj in state ωi.
A voter’s type is informative about the underlying state of nature in the
following sense (which is similar to Myerson (1998)):
ri(ti) > rj(ti) ∀i 6= j. (1)
In the original Condorcet Jury Theorem and in, for example, Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1998), signals are ’correct’ with a probability larger than 1/2. This
means that type ti is the most likely type in state ωi. Eq. (1), a relaxed version
of this assumption, implies that type ti is more likely in state ωi than in any
other state of nature. For two-alternative elections, Myerson (1998) shows that
Eq. (1) ensures the existence of an efficient equilibrium. We show the same for
4Some of the results, such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium or the existence of
an unresponsive equilibrium, still hold if preferences are common and non-dichotomous.
5Population uncertainty implies that a voter does not know precisely how many other
voters there are in the game. This is different from uncertainty about the number of voters
that abstain; some of the voters that are in the game may decide to abstain.
6In a second set of papers on information aggregation in large elections, voters receive
signals from signal technologies that are differently precise (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996, 1997), or Goertz and Maniquet (2009)).
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elections with multiple alternatives. Eq. (1) is essential in several of our proofs.
If type distributions satisfy Eq. (1), there is no aggregate uncertainty in the
population. If all private information was public, the state of nature would be
known and voters would unanimously vote for the correct alternative (the one
that maximizes every voter’s utility). We use this as a benchmark and call an
election outcome informationally efficient if the elected alternative is the same
as the one that would be selected if all information was public.
The voting rule is the plurality rule with the possibility of abstention. Each
voter can vote for one alternative or abstain. So, the action space of a voter
is C = A ∪ φ, where φ denotes abstention. The alternative with the largest
number of votes is elected. We assume a particular tie-breaking rule that is
without loss of generality: Any tie involving alternatives Ai and Aj is broken
in favor of Ai as long as i < j; otherwise, it is broken in favor of Aj .
An economy in our model is defined by a list (A,Ω, q,T, r, n,C) that satisfies
Eq. (1). For any expected size of the population n, a strategy is a function
σn : T → ∆(C), associating a voter type with a probability distribution over
C.7 Let σCn (t) ≥ 0 denote the probability that a voter of type t chooses action
C ∈ C. It has to be true that∑C∈C σcn(t) = 1∀t ∈ T. We simplify the notation
slightly by denoting with σin(t) the probability that a voter chooses to vote for
alternative Ai. Suppose that σ
∗
n is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the voting
game with n expected voters. We are interested in limit equilibria σ∗ such that
σ∗n → σ∗ as n→∞.
Denote by Pσn(Ai|ωj) the probability that alternative Ai is elected in state
ωj given strategy profile σn.
Definition 1. Informationally Efficient Equilibrium A limit equilibrium
σ∗ of an economy E is informationally efficient if it is true that Pσ∗(Ai|ωi) =
1 ∀i.
Following Goertz and Maniquet (2009, 2011), we call a voting rule informa-
tionally efficient if all of its limit equilibria are informationally efficient for all
E . A voting rule is called weakly informationally efficient if it has at least one
efficient limit equilibrium for each E .
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) call an equilibrium strategy profile re-
sponsive, if voters ”change their vote as a function of their private information
with positive probability” (p. 26). Following them, we call a limit equilibrium
responsive if σ∗(ti) 6= σ∗(tj) for at least two different ti, tj ∈ T, i.e., if not all
voter types vote exactly the same way. In an unresponsive equilibrium, all vot-
ers vote the same way, independent of their type. We call a limit equilibrium
unresponsive if σ∗(ti) = σ∗(tj) for all ti 6= tj ∈ T. Following Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996), we call a voting profile informative if all voter types vote for
their type, i.e., if σi∗(ti) = 1 for all i.8 Informative voting is responsive, but
7In Poisson games, strategies are defined type by type. This corresponds to an assumption
of symmetric equilibria in games in which strategies are defined agent by agent.
8Note that voting informatively does not necessarily imply utility maximization. A voter
who maximizes utility given her type may nor may not vote for her type. If a voter’s strategy
is utility maximizing, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) call the voting profile sincere.
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responsive voting is not necessarily informative. If voters vote informatively,
the election outcome accurately reflects the private information in the popu-
lation. Notice that informative voting is not efficient if signals are less likely
correct than incorrect in some state(s) of nature. Surprisingly, we find that it
can nevertheless be an equilibrium.
2.2 Voter Behavior
Before we can prove any results, we need to consider how rational voters vote in a
large Poisson voting game. However, we will only present overarching principles
of voter behavior in this section and relegate the specifics to the respective
proofs and the Appendix.
Recall that voters derive utility from the outcome of the election alone. A
rational voter considers pivotal events in which his or her vote changes the
outcome of the election from a less to a more preferred alternative. Pivotal
events depend on the particular ballot that a voter wants to submit and, to some
extent, on the tie-breaking rule. A voter who considers ballot A2, for example,
is pivotal if alternative A1 has the same number of votes as alternative A2 and
both have at least as many votes as any other alternative. If a voter considers
ballot A1, on the other hand, the voter is pivotal if some alternative has one
more vote than alternative A1 and any other alternative is sufficiently behind.
Generally, denote by Eijk the pivotal event in which one additional vote
for alternative Ai changes the outcome of the election from alternative Aj to
alternative Ai in state ωk. And denote by piv
ij
k the probability of this pivotal
event. The probability of a pivotal event depends on the underlying strategy
profile. To save on notation, we will avoid this additional index, if it is not
misleading. Denote by qi(t) the posterior probability of state ωi conditional on
a voter being of type t. If this voter considers voting for alternative Ai rather
than abstaining, the expected utility gain can be written as
EU(Ai|t) =
∑
j 6=i
[qi(t)piv
ij
i − qj(t)pivijj ]. (2)
If EU(Ai|t) is larger than zero, then the voter prefers voting for Ai to abstain-
ing. If, however, the expected utility gain of some other alternative Aj is even
larger, then the voter prefers voting for Aj instead.
We need to evaluate equations such as Eq. (2) to construct strategies of the
voters. In large elections, the probability of a pivotal event converges to zero,
and so do entire equations such as Eq. (2). However, Myerson (2000) shows
that probabilities of pivotal events do not converge to zero with the same speed.
Events with probabilities that converge to zero faster than others are infinitively
less likely and can therefore be ignored. The difference in the speed of conver-
gence of pivotal probabilities makes comparisons between expected utilities from
different ballots meaningful.
Myerson (2000) proposes the magnitude as a measure for the speed of con-
vergence in a large Poisson game. The magnitude µ of the probability of a
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pivotal event is defined as
µ(Eijk ) = limn→∞
log(pivijk )
n
.
The magnitude of an event is either zero or negative and can be calculated by
solving a maximization problem. Events with larger magnitude converge slower
than those with smaller magnitude and are therefore infinitively more likely. In
the Appendix, we discuss in a little more detail how magnitudes and precise
probabilities of pivotal events are calculated (Magnitude Theorem and Off-Set
Theorem from Myerson (2000)) for the cases arising in our proofs. For a more
detailed discussion, we would like to refer the reader to Myerson (2000) or to
Goertz and Maniquet (2009, 2011).
From Eq. (2) one can immediately deduce some important features of two-
alternative elections. In this case,
EU(Ai|t) = qi(t)piviji − qj(t)pivijj
Suppose that a voter of type tj submits a vote for alternative Ai because
EU(Ai|tj) ≥ 0. Then for a voter of type ti, EU(Ai|ti) > 0 because qi(ti) > qi(tj)
and qj(ti) < qj(tj). This simple argument tells us that in two-alternative elec-
tions, it is necessarily true that 1) a voter of type ti is at least as likely to
vote for alternative Ai as a voter of type tj , and 2) at most one type of voter
mixes. This makes analyzing equilibria much simpler because they can only be
of a few types: 1) Both voter types vote for the same alternative, or 2) voter
type ti mixes between the two alternatives and voter type tj votes for Aj , or
3) voter type ti votes for Ai and voter type tj votes for Aj . Unfortunately,
with more than two alternatives, we cannot narrow down the set of possible
equilibria in a similar way because of the following simple argument. Consider
a three-alternative election with alternatives Ai, Aj , and Ak. Then
EU(Ai|tj) = qi(tj)piviji + qi(tj)piviki − qj(tj)pivijj − qk(tj)pivikk ≥ 0
does not necessarily imply that
EU(Ai|ti) = qi(ti)piviji + qi(ti)piviki − qj(ti)pivijj − qk(ti)pivikk > 0
because, for example, qk(ti) may be so much larger than qk(tj) that voting for
alternative Ai yields lower expected utility for type i than abstaining. With
two alternatives, strategies exhibit a certain monotonicity in types. They no
longer have this property for elections with more alternatives. As a consequence,
general and constructive proofs are very hard to come by because we cannot
narrow down the set of possible equilibrium strategies. Instead of strategies,
we have to characterize equilibria by outcomes. Unfortunately, that leaves a
complete characterization of the set of efficient and inefficient equilibria beyond
reach.
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3 Results
3.1 Existence of Efficient and Unresponsive Equilibria
Contrary to a model with partisan voters (as in Goertz and Maniquet (2009,
2011)), the plurality rule is weakly efficient if all voters have common preferences
because there always exists at least one efficient limit equilibrium for every
economy.
Theorem 1. There exists an informationally efficient limit equilibrium for any
economy E with multiple alternatives if type distributions satisfy Eq. (1).
The proof is an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 2 in Goertz and Maniquet
(2011) to the current model. The result is also closely related to McLennan
(1998) who shows that for a common-value environment as ours, the strategy
profile that maximizes the expected utility of the players is necessarily a Nash
equilibrium of the game.
Proof. The proof is divided into two steps. In step 1, we show that for any E
with a finite number of alternatives that satisfies Eq. (1) there exists a sequence
of strategy profiles σn such that limn→∞Pσn(Ai|ωi) = 1 for all i. To guarantee
that this is true, it is sufficient (due to the Law of Large Numbers) to verify
that the expected fraction of votes for alternative Ai in state ωi is larger than
the expected fraction of votes for each of the other alternatives in that state.9
In step 2, we deduce from step 1 that there exists a limit equilibrium σ∗ that
aggregates information efficiently.
Step 1: Consider an economy E that satisfies Eq. (1). Let 1, 2, 3, ...,|A| be
small positive numbers such that
1r1(t1) = 2r2(t2) = ... = Kr|A|(t|A|).
Consider a sequence of strategy profiles in which for each ti ∈ T, σin(ti) = i
and σφn(ti) = 1− i, i.e., a voter of type ti mixes between voting for alternative
Ai and abstention. Denote by λ
i
j the expected fraction of votes for alternative
Ai in state ωj . Given the strategy profile, the expected fractions of votes for
the different alternatives in state ωi are
λii = ri(ti)i
λji = ri(tj)j ∀j 6= i.
With Eq. (1), it is true for each ωi that λ
i
i > λ
j
i ∀j 6= i. So, by the Law of Large
Numbers, limn→∞Pσn(Ai|ωi) = 1 for all i as n→∞. Notice that σn does not
depend on n.
Step 2: Let σ∗n be a sequence of strategy profiles that maximizes the ex-ante
utility of the voters. Such strategies exist, as they maximize a continuous func-
tion on a compact set. We claim that they are equilibrium strategies. Indeed,
9According to the Law of Large Numbers, the whole mass of probability concentrates in
arbitrarily close neighborhoods around the expected outcomes as n→∞.
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the existence of a profitable deviation would contradict the fact that σ∗n(t) max-
imizes expected utilities. Also, it is impossible that the expected utility from
σ∗n(t) is lower than the expected utility from σn(t) as defined above because the
expected utility of σn(t) tends to 1. So, it has to be true that Pσ∗n(Ai|ωi)→ 1 for
all i as n→∞, and therefore limn→∞σ∗n is a limit equilibrium that aggregates
information efficiently.
Unfortunately, not only efficient equilibria exist. Theorem 2 presents a cer-
tain type of inefficient equilibrium that exists for economies with certain prior
probabilities and type distributions. It is an unresponsive equilibrium because
all voters vote for the same alternative. Notice that this type of equilibrium
cannot be ruled out by ruling out weakly dominated strategies as, in a Poisson
game, all voters have a strictly positive probability of being pivotal.
Theorem 2. For any E that satisfies Eq. (1), there exists an unresponsive
equilibrium in which all voters vote for alternative Ai if and only if qi(t) ≥
qj(t) for all i 6= j and all t ∈ T.
Proof. Consider the strategy profile σi(tj) = 1 ∀j. Then, in all states of nature
ωj , λ
i
j = 1 and λ
k
j = 0 ∀j and ∀k 6= i. This implies that there are only two
pivotal events for each voter; each of these has the same probability in each
state of nature. The first one is one in which no other voter shows up. In this
case, alternative A1 is elected by our tie-breading rule, unless the voter votes for
some other alternative. In the other pivotal event, only one other voter shows
up and, by assumption, votes for alternative Ai. In this case, the voter can
change the the outcome of the election by voting for some alternative Aj with
j < i. Denote by piv0 the probability of the event in which no other voter shows
up and by piv1 the probability of the event in which only one other voter shows
up. Given the Poisson distribution, piv0 = e−n and piv1 = e−nn. We need to
distinguish two cases: 1) i = 1, i.e., all voters vote for alternative A1, and 2)
i 6= 1.
Case 1 : In this case, EU(A1|t) = 0 because there is no pivotal event in which
a voter can change the outcome of the election to A1. Since EU(A1|t) = 0, no
voter prefers abstention. Now consider EU(Aj |t) = qj(t)piv0 − q1(t)piv0 for
j 6= 1. Voting A1 is a best response for all t if qj(t) ≤ q1(t).
Case 2 : Now EU(Ai|t) = qi(t)piv0 − q1(t)piv0. If j < i, then EU(Aj |t) =
qj(t)piv
0−q1(t)piv0+qj(t)piv1−qi(t)piv1. Voting for Ai i a best response for all
t if piv0(qi(t)− q1(t)) ≥ qj(t)piv0− q1(t)piv0 + qj(t)piv1− qi(t)piv1. Notice that
limn→∞ piv
0
piv1 = 0 so that, in the limit, the comparison of utility gains reduces
to 0 ≥ qj(t)piv1 − qi(t)piv1. Voting for Ai is a best response if qi(t) ≥ qj(t) for
all j < i. If j > i, then EU(Aj |t) = qj(t)piv0 − q1(t)piv0. In this case, voting
for Ai is a best response for all t if qi(t)piv
0 − q1(t)piv0 ≥ qj(t)piv0 − q1(t)piv0
or if qi(t) ≥ qj(t) for all j > i. Again, no voter prefers abstention.
Of course, the equilibrium in Theorem 2 is necessarily inefficient because
the correct alternative is elected in only one state of nature. This type of
equilibrium is not particularly interesting. So, in the remainder, we will restrict
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our attention to environments in which this type of equilibria does not exist.
We assume that prior probabilities and type distributions are such that
qi(ti) > qj(ti) ∀i, j 6= i (3)
This condition implies that the posterior belief of a voter of type ti is always
such that state ωi is more likely than any other state of nature. Now, for
two-alternative economies, inefficient equilibria no longer exist.
Theorem 3. For any E with |A| = 2 that satisfies Eq. (3), all equilibria are
efficient.
We relegate the short proof to the Appendix because two-alternative elec-
tions are not our main focus. The proof relies heavily on the fact that in a
two-alternative election, it is always true that a voter of type ti is at least as
likely to vote for alternative Ai as type tj , and vice versa for alternative Aj .
Since strategies no longer have this property with |A| > 2, Theorem 3 does not
hold if |A| > 2.
Due to our discussion above, Theorem 3 is the last general result we can
obtain for elections with multiple alternatives. To investigate properties of elec-
tions with more than two alternatives a bit further, we now restrict our attention
to a specific case and present examples that convey a general messages about
the types of equilibria and coordination failures that can arise.
3.2 Elections with Three Alternatives
In this section, we focus on economies with |A| = 3 that satisfy Eq. (3). First,
we characterize the types of equilibria that exist. Due to the fact that strategies
no longer exhibit any general properties, we cannot characterize the equilibria
in terms of strategies, but do so in terms of outcomes. For an election with
three alternatives, the following types of equilibria exist:10
1. There exist equilibria in which, conditional on a voter being pivotal, two
states of nature are infinitively more likely than the third.
2. There exist equilibria in which, conditional on a voter being pivotal, no
state of nature is infinitively more likely than another.
We call the first type of equilibrium type-1 equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
pivotal events in two states of nature have the same magnitude, and it is larger
than the magnitude of any pivotal event in the third state of nature. In a type-
2 equilibrium, there exists pivotal events in each state of nature that have the
same (and largest) magnitude. Notice that this characterization also holds if
type and prior probabilities satisfy Eq. (1).
There exists no other type of equilibrium. This is quite easy to see: Suppose
10A similar type of characterization can be made for elections with more alternatives as
well.
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that there was an equilibrium in which a pivotal event in ωi had the largest
magnitude, so that ωi was infinitively more likely, conditional on being pivotal,
than any other state. This implies that voters ignore their private information
and vote for Ai. If this was an equilibrium, it would be the one described in
Theorem 2 in which the pivotal events in all states of nature have the same
magnitude. This is a contradiction to the assumption made above. The equi-
librium in Theorem 2 is, in fact, a type-2 equilibrium.
Our first result is that there exist inefficient equilibria with three alternatives
even if Eq. (3) holds. In addition, these equilibria can such that voters vote
informatively.
Theorem 4. There exists economies with |A| = 3 that satisfy Eq.(3) with
inefficient type-1 equilibria in which voters vote informatively.
Proof. We construct E that satisfies Eq.(3) and an inefficient σ∗ in which alter-
native A1 is not elected in state ω1. Suppose that q1 =
1
3 , q2 =
1
3 +, q3 =
1
3 −,
and  sufficiently small. Also assume that r1(t1) = 0.2, r1(t2) = r1(t3) = 0.4,
r2(t1) = 0.1, r2(t2) = 0.5, r2(t3) = 0.4, r3(t1) = 0.1, r3(t2) = 0.4, r3(t3) = 0.5.
We claim that σi∗(ti) = 1 for all i is an equilibrium. The expected fractions of
votes are
λ11 = 0.2, λ
2
1 = λ
3
1 = 0.4,
λ12 = 0.1, λ
2
2 = 0.5, λ
3
2 = 0.4,
λ13 = 0.1, λ
2
3 = 0.4, λ
3
3 = 0.5.
Clearly, σ∗ is inefficient. Now we need to show that σ∗ is an equilibrium.
With the Magnitude Theorem (see Appendix), the magnitudes of the most
likely pivotal events are µ(E232 ) = µ(E
32
2 ) = µ(E
23
3 ) = µ(E
32
3 ) = −(
√
0.5 −√
0.4)2 = −5.75 ∗ 10−3 and µ(E121 ) = µ(E131 ) = −(
√
0.4−√0.2)2 = −0.034. So,
ω2 and ω3 are infinitively more likely, conditional on a voter being pivotal, than
ω1.
Since the most likely pivotal events in states ω2 and ω3 have the same magni-
tude, we will also need to know the relationship between the actual probabilities
of these events. Notice the distribution of votes are the same in ω2 and ω3, so
that we can use the Off-Set Theorem (see Appendix) even if we compare pivotal
probabilities in different states of nature.
Consider E322 and E
32
3 . These occur if A2 and A3 have the same number of
votes. Clearly, it must be the case that piv322 = piv
32
3 .
Now consider E232 and E
23
3 . These occur if A3 has one more vote than A2.
However, their probabilities are not the same in the two states of nature because
λ33 > λ
3
2. The event must be more likely in ω3. Notice, that the probability of
E233 is the same as the probability of E
23
2 − (0,−1, 1), where w = (0,−1, 1) is
a vector of votes. So, E232 − (0,−1, 1) is the event in which A1 has the same
number of votes as in E232 , A2 has one vote more than in E
23
2 , and A3 has one
vote less. Of course, E232 − (0,−1, 1) is not a pivotal event. But we can use it
to apply the Off-Set Theorem.
limn→∞
piv233
piv232
=
∏
i
(λi2)
−w(Ai) =
λ22
λ32
(4)
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So, indeed, the event is more likely in ω3 than in ω2. We can now prove that
σ∗ indicated above is indeed an equilibrium.
Case 1: A voter of type t2.
Considering only the most relevant pivotal events, EU(A2|t2) = q2(t2)piv232 −
q3(t2)piv
23
3 and EU(A3|t2) = q3(t2)piv323 −q2(t2)piv322 . Consider first EU(A2|t2).
This ballot yields a positive expected utility gain if q2(t2)piv
23
2 > q3(t2)piv
23
3 ,
or if q2(t2)λ
3
2 > q3(t2)λ
2
2, or if (
1
3 + )r2(t2)λ
3
2 > (
1
3 − )r3(t2)λ22, which is true.
Now consider EU(A3|t2). This ballot yields a negative expected utility gain if
q3(t2)piv
32
3 < q2(t2)piv
32
3 , or if (
1
3 − )r3(t2) < ( 13 + )r2(t2), which is true. So,
this voter receives a positive expected utility gain from ballot A2 and a nega-
tive expected utility gain from ballot A3. In addition, the expected utility gain
from ballot A2 is necessarily larger than the expected utility gain from ballot
A1 (because of the ranking of pivotal events) or from abstention. Therefore,
voting for A2 is a best response for this voter.
Case 2: A voter of type t3.
Considering only the most relevant pivotal events, EU(A2|t3) = q2(t3)piv232 −
q3(t3)piv
23
3 and EU(A3|t3) = q3(t3)piv323 − q2(t3)piv322 . We use similar argu-
ments as in Case 1 to show: EU(A3|t3) > 0 because ( 13−)r3(t3) > ( 13 +)r2(t3)
for sufficiently small . And EU(A2|t3) < 0 because q2(t3)piv232 < q3(t3)piv233
for sufficiently small . For similar reasons as above, a voter of type t3 also does
not want to submit ballot A1 rather than ballot A3 and also does not want to
abstain. So, the best response of a voter of type t3 is to vote A3.
Case 3: A voter of type t1.
Considering only the most relevant pivotal events, EU(A2|t1) = q2(t1)piv232 −
q3(t1)piv
23
3 and EU(A3|t1) = q3(t1)piv323 − q2(t1)piv322 . Clearly, EU(A2|t1) < 0
because q2(t1)λ
3
2 < q3(t1)λ
2
2 for sufficiently small . And EU(A3|t1) < 0 be-
cause q3(t1) < q2(t1). However, with the ranking of magnitudes, EU(A1|t1) =
q1(t1)piv
12
1 + q1(t1)piv
13
1 > 0. The best response of a voter of type t1 is to vote
for A1.
The equilibrium described in the proof is a type-1 equilibrium. It is ineffi-
cient because voters of types t2 and t3 would both gain from voting more for
alternative A1, but one type will not do so if the other does not as well.
This type of equilibrium can only exist when there are more than two alter-
natives and states of nature. The fact that two states of nature are infinitively
more likely than the third creates competition between the two types of voters
that causes the inefficiency in the third state of nature. Both should both vote a
bit for alternative A1 as so that this alternative wins in ω1. However, no single
type of voter has an incentive to deviate from the current stragegy: If, say, type
t2 voted a bit for A1 and less for A2, but t3 continued voting for A3 only, then
type t2 would decrease the probability of A2 winning in ω2 in order to make
sure that A1 is a bit more likely to win in ω1. This is not a profitable deviation
since state ω2 is much more likely than state ω1. So, if one type does not vote
more for A1, the other one will not either.
While we picked the parameters in the example in the proof to make to make
12
a point, the competition between two types of voters at the expense of the third
alternative will always exist in type-1 equilibria. They will be inefficient as long
as there are not enough voters of the third type (t1 in the proof). This implies
the following:
Corrollary 1. There exist efficient type-1 equilibria. They can be such that
voters vote informatively.
If we change the type distribution in state ω1 from the one in the proof to
r1(t1) = 0.4, r1(t2) = r1(t3) = 0.3, so that there are now sufficient t1 voters
in ω1, the result obtains. The magnitudes are slightly different as in the proof
above, but their ranking carries through, and so do all the other arguments. The
only difference is that now alternative A1 is elected in state ω1. In addition, we
can show:
Corrollary 2. There exist efficient type-2 equilibria. They can be such that
voters vote informatively.
Proof. Consider E such that q1 = 0.8, q2 = 0.1, q3 = 0.1 and r1(t1) = 0.8 =
r2(t2) = r3(t3), r1(t2) = 0.15 = r2(t1) = r3(t1), r1(t3) = 0.05 = r2(t3) = r3(t2).
Arguments and calculations similar to the ones in the proof of Theorem 4 yield
that µ(E121 ), µ(E
12
2 ), and µ(E
13
3 ) all have the same magnitude. So, voters use
their private information as well when calculating expected gains of the different
alternatives. Informative voting is an equilibrium, and it is efficient.
The reader may have noticed that the construction of these equilibria relies
on certain symmetries in prior probabilities and type distributions and may
conclude that these results are non-generic. It is, in fact, non-generic that
voters vote informatively in these types of equilibria. If parameters in the proof
of Theorem 4 are slightly perturbed, voters may no longer vote informatively.
We resort to constructing equilibria that are informative because it is very hard
to find other equilibria. However, the coordination failures that we find depend
more on the type of equilibrium we have than on the fact that voters vote
informatively and are therefore generic. For example, a type-1 equilibrium is
inefficient because of the fact that two states of nature are infinitively more
likely than the third, so that certain types of voters disregard what happens in
the third state.
4 Conclusion
We investigate elections with common preferences, private information, and mul-
tiple alternatives. We show that an efficient equilibrium always exists. We also
show that new types of equilibria with new types of coordination failures arise
in elections with more than two alternatives. These inefficiencies are caused
by coordination failures among voters with common preferences but different
private information.
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The coordination failures we find are strongly related to the types of equilib-
ria that exist. For example, in elections with more than two alternatives, there
exist equilibria in which some states are infinitively more likely than other states,
conditional on being pivotal (this is not true with two alternatives). These types
of equilibria can be inefficient. If they are, the election outcome is inefficient
in the state that voters disregard. Since the voter types who cause the ineffi-
ciency disregard this state of nature, they have no incentive to change their vote.
While a complete characterization of the set of efficient and inefficient equililib-
ria is currently beyond reach, there can be no doubt that increasing the number
of alternatives beyond two increases the number and types of possible coordi-
nation failures between voters immensely and that inefficient equilibria become
more and more common. This should in particular be true for environments in
which voters do not have dichotomous preferences.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank seminar participants of the University of Guelph, Canada,
and of the University of Waterloo, Canada, and two anonymous referees for
helpful comments and suggestions. Johanna M.M. Goertz would also like to
acknowledge the support of CESifo, Munich, Germany. The scientific responsi-
bility is assumed by the authors.
Appendix
A.1 Magnitude Theorem and Off-Set Theorem (Myerson
(2000))
The Magnitude Theorem allows us to calculate the magnitude of pivotal events.
Since the actual number of voters is uncertain, there is a plethora of subevents
that make up a certain pivotal event - each characterized by the fact that two
(or more) alternatives tie or are one vote apart but have a different number of
actual voters. The Magnitude Theorem states that the magnitude of the entire
pivotal event is, in the limit, equal to the magnitude of its most likely subevent.
When calculating the magnitude of an event, one first computes this most likely
subevent by solving a maximization problem and then uses it to calculate the
size of the magnitude.
The Off-Set Theorem allows us to compare the actual probabilities of two
pivotal events that are not two different (i.e, differ only by a finite number of
votes) and occur in the same state of nature. If two states of nature have the
same vote distribution, though, it can be applied as well.
In this Appendix, we only show how to use the Magnitude Theorem and
the Off-Set Theorem for the cases needed in our proofs. For a more general
exposition, we would like to refer the reader to Myerson (2000) or Goertz and
Maniquet (2011).
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A.1.1 Magnitude Theorem
Consider some pivotal event Eijk . Recall that nλ
i
j denotes the expected number
of votes for alternative Ai in state ωj . Denote by N
i
j the actual number of votes
for alternative Ai in state ωj . The most likely subevent of E
ij
k is N
i
k = N
j
k =
n
√
λikλ
j
k (or, N
i
k = n
√
λikλ
j
k and N
j
k = N
i
k + 1 if the pivotal event requires a
one-vote difference with our tie-breaking rule), and N lk = nλ
l
k for all remaining
l.11 Let us know calculate the magnitude of the pivotal event. For our purposes,
it is sufficient to consider the following two distinct cases.
Case 1: Only two alternatives are involved in the close race determining pivotal
event Eijk , i.e., there is no alternative As such that nλ
s
k > n
√
λikλ
j
k.
In this case, the magnitude of the probability of Eijk can be calculated using the
following formula:
µ(Eijk ) = 2
√
λikλ
j
k − (λik + λjk), (5)
Case 2: There exists some alternative As such that nλ
s
k > n
√
λikλ
j
k
In this case, the magnitude of event Eijk has to be calculated using the formula:
µ(Eijk ) = 3
3
√
λikλ
j
kλ
s
k − (λik + λjk + λsk). (6)
The magnitude is now smaller because Eijk is less likely. The reason is that
the most likely outcome for Nsk is nλ
s
k. If this occurred, then a voter would no
longer be pivotal between Ai and Aj . So, As needs to receives less votes.
A.1.2 Off-Set Theorem
The Off-Set Theorem allows us to compare the actual probabilities of two piv-
otal events that are not two different, i.e., that have the same magnitude.12
Consider two pivotal events Eijk and E
lm
k such that E
ij
k = E
lm
k − w, where
w = (w(Ai))Ai∈A is a vector of finite numbers of votes. So, the two pivotal
events differ by a finite number of votes for certain alternatives. Then
limn→∞
pivijk
pivlmk
=
∏
i
limn→∞(λik)
−w(Ai) (7)
The Off-Set Theorem implies that µ(Eijk ) = µ(E
ji
k ). Note, however, that the
Off-Set Theorem can only be used if the two events have the same underlying
distribution of votes. So, they either need to occur in the same state of nature,
or, if they occur in different states of nature, the vote distributions in the two
states needs to be the same. Otherwise, the Off-Set Theorem is not applicable.
11There are cases in which the most likely subevent does not take the simple form stated
above, but these cases do not arise in our analysis.
12The ratio of the probabilities of two pivotal events that have different magnitudes con-
verges to zero or to infinity.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Consider an election with two alternatives, A1 and A2, and two states of nature,
ω1 and ω2. Assume that there exists an inefficient equilibrium in which not
everyone votes for the same alternative. Also assume wlog that this equilibrium
is inefficient because alternative A1 is elected in state ω2. The same type of
argument can be used for any other case.
Recall from our discussion above that a voter of type ti is always at least
as likely to vote for alternative Ai than type tj in a two-alternative election,
i.e., σAi(ti) ≥ σAi(tj), i 6= . This fact, combined with the fact that, by
assumption, not everyone votes for A1, allows us to make certain inferences
about the expected fractions of votes for the different alternatives in the two
states of nature. These lead to inferences about the magnitudes of pivotal events
that lead to a contradiction to the assumed voting behavior. In conclusion, the
only type of inefficient equilibrium in two-alternative elections is the one in
Theorem 2.
In more detail: If alternative A1 is elected in state ω2, then it has to be true that
λ12 ≥ λ22. In addition, σA2(t2) > 0, σA2(t2) ≥ σA2(t1), and σA1(t1) ≥ σA1(t2).
So, the differences in expected fractions of votes are
λ11 − λ21 = r1(t1)(σA1(t1)− σA2(t1)) + r1(t2)(σA1(t2)− σA2(t2))
λ12 − λ22 = r2(t1)(σA1(t1)− σA2(t1)) + r2(t2)(σA1(t2)− σA2(t2))
However, σA1(t1) − σA2(t1) > 0 and σA1(t2) − σA2(t2) < 0. With Eq. (3) (or
Eq. (1)) and with λ12 ≥ λ22, we have λ11 − λ21 > λ12 − λ22 ≥ 0. This implies
that µ(piv212 ) > µ(piv
21
1 ). Therefore, all voters should vote for alternative A2
because, conditional on being pivotal, ω2 is infinitively more likely. This is a
contradiction to the above assumption that σA1(t1) > 0. 
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